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1. Introduction 
“Before I take up these matters, a word of caution. We should not expect too 
much of a theory of civil disobedience, even one framed for special 
circumstances. Precise principles that straightway decide actual cases are 
clearly out of the question. Instead, a useful theory defines a perspective 
within which the problem of civil disobedience can be approached; it 
identifies the relevant considerations and helps us to assign them their correct 
weights in the more important instances. If a theory about these matters 
appears to us, on reflection, to have cleared our vision and to have made our 
considered judgments more coherent, then it has been worthwhile. The theory 
has done what, for the present, one may reasonably expect it to do: namely, to 
narrow the disparity between the conscientious convictions of those who 
accept the basic principles of a democratic society” (Rawls 1971, 362). 
What Rawls wrote nearly forty-five years ago bears repeating. It struck me as a profound guide 
to the efforts which follow. The theory he developed with regards to civil disobedience has since 
become central and influential in political theory. Yet already in 1971 he was acutely aware of 
how different cases require different judgement. He seemed, with the humility that is evident in 
the words above, to have made room for advances which he could hardly predict.  
  Now that these advances have come, they necessitate that we think about the new grey 
areas of political protest. Digital technology has created an increasingly ubiquitous infrastructure 
important to all those living within Western liberal democracies. More and more of our social, 
professional and private lives are taking place on the internet and through the use of digital 
devices.  Importantly, recent years have seen the implementation of these technologies to aid 
political activism: from collecting support for uprisings in Cairo and Tunis to preserving net 
neutrality in the United States. An array of new means has thus arisen. Reflecting traditional 
political protest, they range from peaceful and non-intrusive, like online petitions and blogging, 
to criminal and with far reaching consequences, like identity theft. Electronic civil disobedience 
is somewhere in the middle of this varied spectrum, but as of yet the symbolism and naming 
surrounding it remain vague and unsettled as it is the subject of a polemic of different groups 
which try to appropriate it.  
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  While civil disobedience entails per definition some targeted breach of law, as a means of 
protest it has a “history and legal doctrine to support their legitimacy as valid and protected 
political speech” (Sauter 2014, 95). In contrast, popular methods of electronic civil disobedience 
largely remain criminalized. My proposal is that electronic civil disobedience is a credible 
inheritor of its analogue fore-bearer. Therefore, if the relevant criteria are satisfied, legitimacy 
claims ought to be transferrable from analogue civil disobedience to electronic civil 
disobedience.  
  In a similar vein to Rawls, the ambitions in this thesis are limited. Accordingly, the scope 
I choose is narrow. I want to show that electronic civil disobedience is acceptable, justifiable and 
even desirable in the same way as traditional civil disobedience has been. I defend the passing of 
an equal respect and legitimacy from the analogue to the electronic form. Even though new 
civilly disobedience happens on a novel platform, through the digital medium, the tactics and 
goals remain comparable. Two aspects are most prominent in the following investigation. The 
first is determining what violence, if any, is acceptable. The second is the issue of online 
property and the rights associated with them figures prominently.  
  This work is built like a stairwell; the idea is that each step leads up logically into the 
next. Following this introduction I will describe civil disobedience in general in chapter 2. Then, 
in chapter 3 I will go into the nonviolence criterion Rawls describes and how violence can 
convincingly be defined. Following this will be the analysis of electronic civil disobedience and 
how the preceding findings map onto it in chapter 4. I will discuss important practical examples 
in chapter 5. In final and 6th chapter I will describe various aspects of the transition from 
analogue to electronic civil disobedience. As we reach the top of the metaphorical stairway, we 
will have a found final conclusion as to what extent we ought to accept electronic civil 
disobedience. 
2. Civil Disobedience 
As posited by John Rawls (1971, 364-5), civil disobedience is described as being a “public, 
nonviolent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change 
in laws or government policies”.  Rawls’ definition has five elements. Three of these are 
underlying criteria, one is a condition of the action itself and finally there is an aim.  
  The first criterion is that it is public; acts of civil disobedience should not be secret 
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operations. A main reason for this is that civil disobedience aims to attract the attention. Rawls 
describes it as the civilly disobedient group engaging in their act  openly and with fair notice 
(1971, 366). He compares it to holding a speech out in public, which “a form of address, an 
expression of profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place in the public forum” 
(1971, 366). The disobedients hope then is that this leads to those seeing, hearing and hearing 
about their undertakings having discussions. As the issue gets increased media coverage, the 
eventually goal is to gain more support.  
  The second criterion is nonviolence; the means of protest should be peaceful. In a number 
of the following sections I will more deeply explore the controversy surrounding its 
conceptualization. It will feature repeatedly as it is the main aspect of ECD I will discuss.  
  The third criterion is that acts of civil disobedience should be conscientious, as opposed 
to whimsical or frivolous; there is a responsibility to justify the disobedient act. This 
responsibility ties in with securing public support. But a strong and convincing rationale of why 
disobedience is necessary not only to sway the public, it strengthens the movement in and of 
itself as it demonstrates its “seriousness, sincerity and moral conviction” (Brownlee 2009). 
“’Conscientiousness” implies that the civil disobedients have a sincere and serious belief that a 
law or policy warrants re-examination by the government, and that the risk of an injustice allows 
for a law-breaking action in order to communicate such a belief” (Moraro 2007, 5). It is sincere, 
because disobedients refer to principles of justice, where they could have also have referred to 
other, less important, values; such as monetary profit. It is also serious, because there is “genuine 
concern about a diversion from the shared conception of justice that underlies the political 
society” (Moraro 2007, 5). Piero Moraro then puts the conscientious criteria most strongly when 
he says: “Under these circumstances, individuals would be morally inconsistent in denying 
having reasons to engage in civil disobedience against that law or policy” (2007, 5, italics in the 
original). Moral individuals seem therefore, if they place any value in acting in accordance with 
and upon their moral principles, forced to undertake civilly disobedient acts in the face of certain 
persistent injustices. A person who claims to be moral, but fails to act in accordance with her 
outlined moral values, can hardly justly call herself moral
1
. That would be hypocrisy.  
                                                 
1Of course, there is an exception possible when there are constraints on one’s acts. If a person is 
held prisoner, she can hardly act on her moral value to feed the ducks outside her house or 
combat sexism.  
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  In summary, what constitutes conscientiousness is to act in accordance with morality. 
Conscientious disobedients want to communicate to the onlookers and hearers their “sincerity, 
seriousness and moral consistency” (Moraro 2007, 5). Moraro adds a caveat in that what civilly 
disobedients believe can be sincere and serious, but untrue. They might wrongly interpret what 
they perceive as injustice, while it is not so in truth. However, concludes Moraro, their 
undertakings can still be conscientious, even though they are wrong (2007, 5). 
  Furthermore, there is a condition for an action of dissent before it can be termed civilly 
disobedient, namely that there a breach of law. Whereas the criteria present the framework for 
the “civil” part, this condition is where the “disobedience” part becomes evident. Usually 
however, the breach of law is on a very specific and narrow ground, the disobedients do not aim 
to overthrow the entire system against which they protest, they only want to change that part 
which they find unjust.  
  There is an important distinction to be made here when it comes to this breach of law and 
the respect which remains to the legal system. A recurring feature in civil disobedience which 
illustrates this stance is the acceptance of punishments. The most famous examples of these are 
those of Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr
2
. who spent time in jail. By accepting the rulings of 
the judicial system, disobedients still obey the rule of law in all parts, excepting the specific part 
where they breached it. This is what is termed “fidelity to law”.  Even though they break the law, 
disobedients are willing to accept the legal consequences of their behavior. Furthermore, with 
this willingness they reinforce the public and nonviolent nature of the act (Rawls 1971, 366).  
  It is an overarching theme for disobedience movements; these nonviolence and publicity 
criteria and the submission to the legal repercussions of actions: “are often regarded as marks of 
disobedients' fidelity to the legal system in which they carry out their protest. This is part of what 
distinguishes them from rebels” (Brownlee 2009). This is not to say (as is similar for all of this 
                                                 
2
 Martin Luther King Jr. writes about this in his Letter From A Birmingham Jail when he says: “I 
hope you can see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no sense do I advocate evading or 
defying the law as the rabid segregationist would do. This would lead to anarchy. One who 
breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly (not hatefully as the white mothers did in New 
Orleans when they were seen on television screaming, “nigger, nigger, nigger”), and with a 
willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks law that conscience tells 
him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscious of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law”  ([1963] 
2011, 833-4) 
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entire definition), that this is uncontested. Howard Zinn disagrees with Rawls and would like to 
define civil disobedience more broadly. In this instance, his claim is that fidelity to law is not 
required. In response, Rawls writes that although he accepts there is some room for some 
latitude, in his view an imprisoned civil disobedient would not “accept the punishment as right, 
that is, as deserved for an unjustified act. Rather one is willing to undergo the legal consequences 
for the sake of fidelity to law, which is a different matter” (1971, 366). This speaks of his view of 
fidelity to law as inherently valuable; it is necessary component of a well-ordered and well-
functioning society. A society in which all people are so honest and just that any breaches of law 
would be conscientious and defensible acts only exists in theory (Rawls 1971, 367). 
  Finally, the aim of policy change defines the movement, namely through what it stands 
for and from what it draws its rationale and support.  Civil disobedience is a political act (Rawls 
1971, 365) because, in addition to being addressed to the majority which is in political power, it 
is being “guided and justified by political principles” (Rawls 1971, 365). With these principles 
Rawls refers to principles of justice which “regulate the constitution and social institutions 
generally” (Rawls 1971, 365). When civil disobedience is to being justified, it is in Rawls view, 
not appropriate to refer to personal morality or religion, even though there might be some 
overlap
3
 (1971, 365). This is similar to how conscientiousness was presented with regards to 
being a criterion hereinabove; the underlying appeal throughout civil disobedience is to justice. 
Moreover, civil disobedience cannot be in the interest of just one private individual (Rawls 1971, 
365). However, this does not mean per se that one person alone cannot carry out a civilly 
disobedient act. If the person acts in order to repair justice where she finds it broken, her act can 
be defended, as it is in the interest of the entire society, not solely this one individual.   
  The appeal is to a shared idea about justice which exists not only in the disobedient 
minority, but in the majority in political power as well. Rawls assumes that in a “reasonably just 
democratic regime there is a public conception of justice by reference to which citizens regulate 
their political affairs and interpret the constitution” (Rawls 1971, 365). He claims that the basic 
principles of justice here are “fundamental equal liberties” (Rawls 1971, 366). When these 
principles are wittingly violated over a long period of time there can be two responses. The first 
                                                 
3
 This has potential for further study, seeing as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. were both 
well known as being deeply religious men. An investigation in how much their religiosity has 
influenced and guided their political protest could reveal a conflict with Rawls’ position hereon.  
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is submission and the second is resistance. It is unsurprising that in a group then springs into 
action, taking to the latter response: resistance. With the civilly disobedient act, then, the 
minority asks the majority to consider whether “it wishes to acknowledge the legitimate claims 
of the minority” (Rawls 1971, 366). 
  Understanding all this, it becomes increasingly clear that the initial pithy definition 
excludes other acts which may contain one or parts of the criteria, condition or aim, but which 
are fundamentally different acts. The three criteria distinguish it from other forms of political 
dissent or plain crime. Let us look at a few short examples. I can imagine criminality being in 
some cases argued to be public and nonviolent. However, the explicit formulation of the aim 
being policy-change as well as the element of conscientiousness distinguishes it from civil 
disobedience. Militancy can be public, aim to bring about change in policy through breaches of 
law and in some cases even be conscientious, but it is excluded as it is violent. Finally, legal 
protest can be very similar when it is public, nonviolent and conscientious and can aim to bring 
about a change in laws or government policies, but it is distinguished by the absence of a breach 
of law. 
  The choice for relying solely on Rawls definition of civil disobedience has three main 
reasons. The first reason is one of scope, to compare and contrast different definitions would be 
too tangential for my aims. My attention here will be directed mainly at electronic civil 
disobedience; to rehash old debates would take away from that. Second, to say Rawls’ definition 
of civil disobedience is the golden standard might be too much praise, but it is hard to deny its 
influence and importance within the realm of political theory (Brownlee 2009). The third and 
final reason is that it is practical in for the investigation of the issues critics brings up, as these 
are all in relation to Rawls’ definition. 
2.1 Nearly Just Societies 
Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience discusses the “appropriateness of civil disobedience to 
legitimately established democratic authority” (Rawls 1971, 363). He specifies that civil 
disobedience is legitimate only in nearly just societies. Rawls stresses that such societies ought to 
have democratic rule (Rawls 1971, 363). Furthermore, nearly just societies are those which are 
“‘well-ordered’, regulated by a constitution based on the shared conception of justice, but in 
which there is the presence of ‘some degree’ of injustice” (1971, 363). This means that 
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disobedients think the majority which is political power has used their power in order to subvert 
an underlying and constitutional justice (Moraro 2007, 5).        
  Hopefully, this majority can still be open to change its stance when it becomes fully 
apparent to them that they have acted unjustly. A scenario can be imagined in which such 
injustices flow from neglect. Some constitutional rights might slowly, but gradually erode so that 
when an unacceptable point is reached it is not per se through deliberate action, but through 
ignorant inaction. In a nearly just society “citizens would still accept the majority in power as 
legitimate, and would still believe in future cooperation with it […]” (Moraro 2007, 5). Just 
because they disagree at the moment of the disobedient act, does not mean all political 
association, communication or cooperation is dismissed. This is part of civil disobedience as a 
political act, to dismiss the possibility of all these options would make the act apolitical. 
Therefore, “in essence, they would assume that communication is possible” (Moraro 2007, 5). 
One can construe civil disobedience itself as a communicative act and thus when one engages in 
it, it is with the underlying assumption that communication is possible. Just achieving serious 
engagement in dialogue on controversial, forgotten or suppressed issues might even already be 
considered a triumph in certain cases.    
  But all of these claims of what constitutes a nearly just society can be criticized. Moraro 
says for instance that this conceptualization of a nearly just society can be too restrictive. He 
takes the example of Nazi Germany as being antithetical to the just society and says that in 
between those two there is a wide middle ground (Moraro 2007, 4). The examples of Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King Jr. were both in societies which were clearly not nearly just in this sense. 
Still, both preferred civil disobedience to other forms of political protest. “Rawls […] does not 
deny that a nearly just society may involve “serious” injustice, that those practicing it may be 
‘immovable and apathetic’ […] willing to enforce the injustice with the use of illegitimate force. 
The problem seems to be that it would be hard to define a society like this as ‘nearly just’” 
(Moraro 2007 4.). Therefore, civil disobedience should also be a possibility in societies which 
would be deemed unjust in Rawlsian terms. We will, however, stay within the contexts of the 
nearly just societies, as a means of limiting scope. 
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3. Nonviolence 
The main underlying point of interest in this investigation is Rawls’ inclusion of the nonviolence 
criterion. This has become a central identifier for civil disobedience movements: “nonviolence 
may very well be the notion most often associated with civil disobedience both in the public 
imaginary and in theoretical discussions” (Celikates 2015, 9). However, not all agree that it is 
rightfully included. As seen already in earlier criticism, some argue for a broader and more 
inclusive conceptualization. Hence, there are multiple ways in which nonviolence being a 
necessary component of civil disobedience is defended and attacked. Therefore, before we can 
proceed, we must lay the foundation for our discussion by investigating what violence in this 
context means. 
  In this chapter I will first distinguish persuasion and coercion. In the section following 
this, I will describe a satisfying description of violence in the context of civil disobedience. I will 
conclude with my judgement of to what degree violence is acceptable.  
3.1 Persuasion & Coercion 
One important distinction which recurs in the literature on violence in civil disobedience is the 
difference between persuasion and coercion. The first is an appeal to public conscience and the 
second relies on the use of threats (Moraro 2007, 5). This distinction is especially relevant for 
electronic civil disobedience when for instance we separate it from hacktivism is section 5.1. 
  A blockade is an example of the persuasion. In a blockade access and use of a space, 
which can be either public or private, is limited. Blockaders want to expand awareness with 
regard to their perceived injustice in society and to influence public opinion. A threat is an 
example of coercion. If the goals of the disobedients are not met, they threaten to respond with 
some “dire consequences” (Falcon Y Tella 2004, 316).  
  There is a difference in attitude here, namely that coercion is of a more forcing and 
uncompromising nature, whereas persuasion is less confrontational. When the defining goal is 
persuasion, the aim is specifically towards the majority in political power and in convincing 
them that change is necessary (Moraro 2007, 5).   Persuaders would rather charm than harm the 
majority in political power, believing that solid arguments and a demonstration of the issues’ 
vitality will be convincing. Persuaders’ acts are more likely to be temporary, whereas coercers’ 
acts are last longer. Moreover, coercers would act quicker and more often repeat their actions 
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which can involve lasting or even irreversible damage. Although coercers certainly aim to 
influence public opinion on the issue of a perceived injustice they are, in essence, are saying “or 
else”.   
  One final note here is that in reality this distinction presents itself not so much as a 
dichotomy, but as a spectrum. Political protest can for instance be predominantly be either more 
persuasive or coercive yet contain elements of the other. As an example, of a large group of 
peaceful protestors some sympathizers may take to violent action. 
3.2 Violence in Civil Disobedience 
The definition of violence upon which I have settled and determined that it encompasses relevant 
and important aspects is taken from the literature specifically on violence in civil disobedience. It 
is based specifically on Moraro (2007) and Morreal (2005). The aspects they stress, which are 
also important here are psychological violence, as well as violence to the free ownership of 
property. These are important because the former is sometimes neglected while at times it can be 
more impactful than physical violence. The latter is especially important seeing as the following 
chapters on electronic civil disobedience have to do specifically with potential violation of 
property rights.  I have chosen to sub-divide this into what is relevant to persons and what is 
relevant to property.  
To persons 
Violating values, integrity or sacredness is all part of violence according to Morreal. His position 
is that these constitute prima facie individual rights which can per definition be less important 
than other, more important or absolute rights
4
. This goes further by far than just bodily harm, 
which is especially evident in the addition of sacredness seeing as this is usually part of a 
personal religious belief. Doing harm to any part of a person important to her religious view of 
herself would necessarily be deemed violent as well then. For example, the hair hijab or nikab of 
                                                 
4 The most important point of contention is which rights or duties outweigh one another per case. 
In this context Morreal would be more inclined to allow for violence when it serves a 
superseding moral claim (Morreal 2005, 37-9) whereas Moraro is opposed to that because as he 
follows the Kantian Formula of Humanity (Moraro 2007, 7) according to which no one can be 
treated as a mere means. This does not mean that Moraro never allows for violence, but it does 
mean that he ascribes more relative worth to the mentioned values, integrity and sacredness for 
Moraro than Morreal. 
12 
 
a Muslim woman is sacred to her, as is the long hair of the Sikh. Psychological violence is also 
included as this stops individuals being able to make decisions freely and to then carry them out.  
To property 
There is a basic right to control and own property in a liberal democratic society. According to 
Morreal this is not to be interfered with and doing so can be considered violent. Moreover, as 
there is no specific distinction made by him between public and private property, his definition 
applies to both. Using this definition of violence is problematic when one sees occupation or 
trespassing as nonviolent, as these tactics interfere with these basic rights, especially where it 
pertains to private property. For example, in this definition, occupation of the area in front of my 
door can be seen as violent as it takes away my right to freely access my home.  
  Things become less clear when we look at public property. This is for me the most 
problematic aspect of violence.  Earlier, we have concluded civil disobedience to be a public, 
communicative act. But there is one difference with holding a speech in a public forum; we must 
remember that for an act to be civilly disobedient, it must break some law. Protest in public 
spaces can lead to a disruption of the normal flow of traffic. This is a tactic which is easy to 
understand, as it would certainly lead to big gain of attention. It is just as easy to imagine that 
doing this can involve breaches of law. But seeing as the goal of the civilly disobedient protest is 
influencing public at large, their attention is a most valuable currency.  
   The traditional means of civil disobedience are occupation and trespass; trespassing onto 
private property breaks a law in and of itself. This fulfills the breach of law condition of the 
action as we discussed in the section on Rawls’s definition. The law here is not broken 
frivolously. It is broken specifically at a certain point or in a certain place to address a certain 
issue. Civilly disobedience protestors with an environment cause might choose to trespass and 
occupy the premises of a refinery which is causing pollution. They are specifically breaking the 
law against a corporation in a certain location in order to address their perceived injustice. 
Moreover, the civilly disobedient act is doing this, as we recall from chapter two to rectify or 
repair or improve a sense of overarching justice which seems to be lacking. Saving the 
surrounding areas from potentially disastrous pollutants can certainly fall within that category. 
  However, having taken Morreal’s view of what constitutes violence; this means that the 
traditional means of trespass and occupation which occur often in disobedient movements are 
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deemed violent when done on private property. There must be clear limits, however, and fidelity 
to law must hold. For instance, if occupation (in)directly damages a small business, the owner 
must be recompensed. Operating under the civilly disobedient banner ought never give license 
for whimsical or frivolous destruction and always be governed by the disobedients 
conscientiousness. Therefore, knowing and willing damage which is unrelated to the civilly 
disobedient act is simply criminal and unacceptable. Occupation of a factory might serve to 
address the injustice of not abiding by labor laws, but destroying the appliances does not. 
  If we accept damage to property as part of civil disobedience, this poses a problem for its 
nonviolence criterion.  There are two plausible options, which are not per se incompatible. The 
first is to deny this view of violence and to deny that damage to property actually count as 
violent. However, I find this difficult to do as I side with Morreal and hold the (uncontroversial, 
but not uncontested) view that you can hurt someone severely by taking away or damaging their 
property. The second option is to say that curtailed damage to property is acceptable in some 
cases, while violence to persons is never acceptable.  
  A practical problem might arise in the form of some damage to property causing 
psychological damage. If there is a reasonable and realistic claim of this, then this is to be 
avoided, as much as possible. Here Moraro’s caveat of treating people as ends should prevail. 
3.3 Judgement 
As Celikates made clear, our conviction of what is acceptable behavior depends in part upon our 
definition of violence. What is more, the narrowness or broadness of the selected definition 
comes with political and theoretical trade-offs (2015, 12). The definition I selected includes 
psychological violence and damage to the free ability to control and make decisions about 
property. However, as made clear earlier, although the definition definitively frames the 
parameters of the discussion, it does not force me into either the violent or nonviolent camp per 
se.   
  A clarifying distinction is given by Moraro, who describes two factions. The first is the 
moderate one which affirms that “violence should be excluded entirely from civil disobedience” 
(Moraro 2007, 6). The second faction is described as a radical one, by which violence is 
admitted, when directed against the State and also against “its representatives and third parties 
directly or indirectly linked to the state”. As became clear in the previous sections, violence 
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against persons is what is at issue here.  
  Radicals see civil disobedience not per se as nonviolent. “They assumed that, although 
civil disobedience cannot aim at moral or physical destruction of the adversary, a certain risk of 
violence -on occasion and always as a secondary condition is to be accepted” (Moraro 2007, 6). 
What is most important to them is to carefully choose effective and efficient means while staying 
within proportions to the injustices against which the disobedients act (Moraro 2007, 6). 
  Historically and usually, civilly disobedient breaches of law which infringe upon the 
freedom to control and make decisions about property have fallen into the category of nonviolent 
civil disobedience. For example Gandhi’s Salt March was considered an effective nonviolent act. 
Gandhi and followers broke a specific unjust law, transparently and publicly providing a 
rationale (Meikle 2008, 6). Yet, in my definition, it was violent against the property laws of the 
time. He was stealing what was British property. So here is an issue, and I feel that continuing to 
describe violating property rights as being nonviolent is at the very least misleading.  
  To be sure, there must be serious, but reasonable, caveats. As we should remember from 
the start of chapter 2, definition of civil disobedience which is adhered to here is that of civil 
disobedience is described as being a “public, nonviolent and conscientious breach of law 
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies” (Rawls 
1971, 364-5). The surface simplicity and brevity of this definition carries a profound depth. One 
of the aspects of this depth pertaining here especially to the nonviolence criterion is the 
interconnectedness of these criteria. Frivolous, whimsical or wanton destruction can under no 
circumstances be allowed as they collide head-on with the conscientious criterion. Moreover, in 
the same way of reasoning, theft can never be justified either. Property damage which occurs 
must be visible to the public, so as to also abide by Rawls first criterion. The public can then 
even be in a position to judge the sincerity of the disobedients’ conscientious convictions. And so 
they ought to keep within restrained limits, violating only those property rights they needed to 
draw attention to the particular perceived injustice they mean to address. Additionally, damage 
done in secret, even if done conscientiously, does not serve the movement. 
   In keeping with the line being drawn at violence against persons, any direct, or a 
reasonable expectation of in-direct, physical injury or harm against a person is to be prevented as 
much as possible. Moreover, psychological violence done to those affected by occupation or 
trespass is more difficult to predict and measure, but is to be limited as much as possible as well.       
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  I am not denying that under certain circumstances oppression might be so severe, bloody 
and unjust that there is little reasonable alternative to violent resistance. However, this resistance 
then is categorially separate from civil disobedience.  
4. Electronic Civil Disobedience 
The work thus far has all been a lead-in as I have built up a fundament upon which we can 
discuss the titular issue. My judgement has been that violence to property in civil disobedience is 
acceptable under certain limited circumstances. In the following sections the attention will be on 
whether this acceptability carries over from “traditional” or analogue civil disobedience (from 
now on: ACD) to electronic civil disobedience (ECD). Furthermore, to determine whether this 
judgement can be transposed it is necessary to assess whether this new environment can allow 
for the same Rawlsian definition to apply. It is a test which is necessary to pass in order for us to 
keep applying similar norms. 
  Investigating transposability is important, because it is imaginable that the nature of a 
novel platform is limiting insofar as that it excludes the opportunity of one of the criteria. For 
example, early on in the development of the internet it would be a poor platform for civil 
disobedience, as communication of a perceived injustice to the public would be nigh on 
impossible since few would even have the means to be communicated to. Similar problems 
might occur with ECD on telephone networks, although in both of these cases creative acts of 
communication can appeal to the public. During a telephone sit-in, for instance, it is imaginable 
that the conscientious basis for the protestors’ actions is communicated by protestors calling 
broadcast media, which can effectively disseminate their message.  If protesters online act in 
accordance with the other tenets of the definition of civil disobedience as we set out, namely 
their breach of law having the aim of policy change and abiding by the conscientious, public and 
nonviolent criteria, then the transposition becomes a more credible option. As the digital 
infrastructure is fitted especially well for communication, ECD can perhaps be an even better 
suited and effective tool for political communication of perceived injustices. 
  First then, I will describe in this section what I understand as electronic civil 
disobedience. Following this, I will address the question of property ownership in cyberspace 
and what consequences this has. Then, I will tackle various aspects of the Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks and virtual sit-ins as they constitute the most noteworthy tools of ECD.   
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Electronic Civil Disobedience is the term given to political action using electronic technology, 
which in practice is mostly digital technology and most often specifically happens on the 
internet. An encompassing definition is given by Stefan Wray in a seminal essay on electronic 
civil disobedience:  
“Acting in the tradition of nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience, 
proponents of Electronic Civil Disobedience are borrowing the tactics of 
trespass and blockade from these earlier social movements and are 
experimentally applying them to the Internet. A typical civil disobedience 
tactic has been for a group of people to physically blockade, with their 
bodies, the entranceways of an opponent's office or building or to physically 
occupy an opponent's office -- to have a sit-in. Electronic Civil Disobedience, 
as a form of mass decentered electronic direct action, utilizes virtual 
blockades and virtual sit-ins. Unlike the participant in a traditional civil 
disobedience action, an ECD actor can participate in virtual blockades and 
sit-ins from home, from work, from the university, or from other points of 
access to the Net” (Wray 1998). 
The reason why ECD is intriguing is that it is relatively young; it is still very much in its 
developmental stage. Contention has arisen about which way this development ought to go. 
Should ECD remain true to analogue criteria or should the new possibilities of a changed 
environment encourage adaptation. There are two mains ways in which influential groups have 
argued ECD should develop. These can be broken up into as advocacy for either discontinuity or 
continuity. The first influential group, the Critical Art Ensemble (CAE), advocates discontinuity. 
The CAE argues for instance for a more secretive approach, preferring ECD as “an underground 
activity that should be kept out of the public/popular sphere (as in the hacker tradition) and the 
eye of the media” (CAE 2001, 14). In their eyes the changing environment gives new tools 
which should be used. Their manifesto on this topic (Electronic Civil Disobedience and Other 
Unpopular Ideas 1996) has a number of critical points on a gradual transition from ACD to ECD 
in which values and norms are carried over. First of all, they say analogue civil disobedience is 
decreasing in value and strength. As information has becomes the most important source of 
“power-capital” (CAE 1996, 9) physical acts of protest have become less effective. The most 
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important aspect of the political protest then is to be effective through the act itself. “[The] CAE 
has said it before, and we will say it again: as far as power is concerned, the streets are dead 
capital! Nothing of value to the power elite can be found on the streets, nor does this class need 
control of the streets to efficiently run and maintain state institutions” (CAE 1996, 11). The 
environment for political protest is changing 
  The Critical Art Ensemble firmly placed themselves in the camp of the coercers, as 
typologized in section 3.1. This becomes evident in the expression of the following sentiment: 
“For CD to have any meaningful effect, the resisters must appropriate something of value to the 
state. Once they have an object of value, the resisters have a platform from which they may 
bargain for (or perhaps demand) change” (CAE 1996, 11). With this it goes further than the 
limits of nonviolent civil disobedience as here it condones the use of threats, encourages theft.  
  The aims of electronic civil disobedience ought not to be, as was the case for Rawls, to be 
a political tool for the communication of injustices, but even be the basis for insurrection as 
likely targets which are mentioned are not only the government and corporations, but also the 
military (CAE 1996, 13). Instead of singular or insulated issues of injustice, the CAE is radically 
against the entire system. In its call to insurrection it presents that increasing wealth inequality 
and the related problems of crime, disease and poverty leave little choice but to resist (CAE 
1996, 10-1). Electronic means, then, are included and a part of a type of “any means necessary” 
protest. The CAE would protest strongly against the notion that much of the western liberal 
democracies are nearly just environments. The tools of ECD should be the most effective and it 
does not matter whether they are violent. The CAE justifies this, in summary, with their concern 
for the effect of a growing power disparity. Clandestine, violent and non-conscientious actions 
then all become acceptable in an effort to resist an authoritarian tyranny.  
  On the other side is the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), of which Stefan Wray is a 
member and which has ideological ties with the influential Electrohippies movement. EDT 
proposes continuity. They believe that ECD ought to keep alive the core values, which we know 
from the Rawlsian definition. Where CAE might propose to include clandestine measures, the 
EDT advocates a “more transparent public spectacle which aimed to draw as many participants 
together as possible as sharing commonalities” (Meikle 2008, 6)5. In this early stage this issue is 
                                                 
5
 It deserves mention that Meikle discerned a third way in which the transition to ECD is 
observed. That is namely as an act of terrorism. “one survey of Internet politics includes a brief 
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largely left unsettled. Still, how ECD is defined is exactly the point upon which its legitimacy 
and credibility hang. Meikle stresses the importance of this issue of naming and symbolism as he 
addresses the importance of what he calls symbolic power: “James Carey once argued that reality 
is ‘a scarce resource’ (1989, 87). In this, the ability to define reality is also, as Carey puts it, a 
‘fundamental form of power’ (1989, 87). This ‘fundamental form of power’ is what Bourdieu 
calls ‘symbolic power’ — ‘Symbolic power is a power of constructing reality’ (1991, 166)” In 
other words, what words people use to describe phenomena and what connotations are attached 
to those words informs the perception of the phenomena. The act of describing an event can 
condemn the actors undertaking the act with the use of certain words. A salient example which 
recurs in media is that sometimes similar groups of militants, undertaking similar actions, are at 
times described as rebels while at others they are described as freedom fighters.“This is the 
ability 'to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to create 
events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms’” (Meikle 2008, 15). 
  I prefer the continuity to the discontinuity approach. First and foremost, where the 
Critical Art Ensemble goes, I cannot in good conscience follow, as they marry ECD to a whole 
host of increasingly violent and criminal acts: “For more radical cells ECD is only the first step. 
Electronic violence, such as data hostages and system crashes, are also an option. Are such 
strategies and tactics a misguided nihilism?  CAE thinks not” (CAE 1996, 24). The Critical Art 
Ensemble was one of the strongest advocates of DDoS being an example of how analogue civil 
disobedience can be directly copied into the digital world and even go further. To them too, it 
was a logical transition, but they even want to achieve more potent protests as they propose that 
“blocking information conduits is analogous to blocking physical locations: however, electronic 
blockade can cause financial stress that physical blockage cannot and it can be used beyond the 
local level. [Electronic civil disobedience] is civil disobedience invigorated. What CD once was, 
ECD is now” (CAE 1996, 18). This expected escalation is unacceptable to me, as it devalues 
ECD. Introducing electronic violence into ECD categorizes it with different forms of protest. It is 
                                                                                                                                                             
account of the EDT and FloodNet in a chapter on ‘criminal activity in cyberspace’, which 
concludes that cyberspace ‘needs to be safeguarded against terrorist attacks’ (Margolis & 
Resnick 2000, 202). Terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman also discusses ECD in a terrorism frame, 
quoting a human rights activist from an established NGO under the sub-heading ‘Terrorist and 
Insurgent Use of the Internet’ (2006, 201) (Meikle 2008, 15). While ECD disrupts, it certainly 
ought to, in the form as I describe it, takes care to stay away from violent behavior. Lumping it in 
with terrorism is either lazy or ignorant and probably both. 
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important to remain true to the criteria Rawls set out, here specifically the nonviolence criterion; 
as only in staying true is it realistic to reap the benefits of the respect analogue civil disobedience 
has. Moving away from those criteria takes away from legitimacy, esteem and erodes public 
support.   
  In addition, I cannot find a reasonable argument that this new medium necessitates a new 
moral schema. More specifically, the emergence of new pervasive digital technology does not 
mean that our pre-existing ethical system does not apply. Of course, new technology gives rise to 
new moral questions and in some cases these questions have not been seriously considered yet. 
However, this is not sufficiently the case where the transition towards electronic civil 
disobedience is concerned. Accepting a measure of commonality leads to the possibility 
transposing the judgement we arrived on with regards to nonviolence in ACD to ECD. At the 
same time structural differences implore in-depth re-examination. Having proved then that it is 
reasonably possible, the ensuing challenge is exactly how we can transfer the answers we found 
in the analogue world as it is undeniable that the new digital infrastructure is unique.  
  One further question can briefly be asked about the terminology. At times digital civil 
disobedience is also used, for instance in the research of Theresa Züger. Her definition does not 
significantly differentiate itself as describing a different sort of act and therefore seems to all 
relevant purposes interchangeable with electronic civil disobedience. I prefer electronic civil 
disobedience as it is the term most frequently used in the relevant literature, so this uniformity 
promotes theoretical and conceptual clarity. 
4.1 Violence in ECD   
As should be obvious to most contemporaries, the advance of digital technology and our 
increased reliance on the functioning of its infrastructure for the operation of our daily lives, into 
even the smallest of minutia, has given an increase in options for what can be termed broadly as 
digital dissent. Many innovative means for the sabotage of novel digital targets have been 
developed. Similar to my acceptance of violence under certain circumstances, such innovative 
means might at times be justifiable and effective, yet I advocate they be considered separate from 
ECD. In Rawls’ words: “I do not at all mean to say that only this form of dissent is ever justified 
in a democratic state (1971, 364)”. It is undeniable that violent acts can be effective. It might 
even be appropriate, when oppression is so terrible that the only way to relieve the pressure is to 
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lash out. Such situations and reactions to them might occur, as Rawls presents, even in 
democratic societies.  
  The days in which electronic and digital devices were mere additions to some of our lives 
have long since passed. For most of us in liberal democracies these devices are integral parts of 
our daily lives, conducting the management of infrastructure, communication and the transfer of 
currencies. These systems breaking down can have disastrous effects and cause serious harm. 
This brings to the fore the question of where the line is online, between peaceful and violent 
protest. When protesters go against the essential nonviolence criterion, their act cannot be called 
civilly disobedient. It can be a perfectly justified militant uprising against an oppressive regime, 
but is in a different category of political protest. Just as legal protest and bloody revolution flank 
civil disobedience on opposite extremes of a spectrum, electronic disobedience as a form of 
political protest is flanked by other forms of political protest online, such as legal electronic 
protest
6
 and cyber warfare. Moreover, recent years have seen the rise of “hacktivism” and 
internet vigilantism. Some political activists, like the CAE, would like to place all of these under 
the banner of ECD and so seek the legitimacy and respect which civil disobedience movements 
have historically received.  
  However, I object to these means as being or becoming part of ECD. The most important 
reason for this is that they are violent. For example, Ruining a bank’s digital system of 
operations and communications can have disastrous effects and lead to the poverty, hunger or 
severe psychological damage of many. In the same vein, online witch hunts or vendettas, which 
belong in the repertoire of hacker-groups such as Anonymous, can also never be part of ECD. 
The psychological damage, as described in sections 3.2 and 3.3, which can reasonably be 
expected as a result is not acceptable. Another, simpler, reason is that this separation increases 
conceptual clarity, which is important for theoretical discussion. Throwing all of online political 
protests into a mixed bag entitled ECD is nonsensical and unhelpful for further analysis. In 
addition, clarifying the identification of types of protest in theory could also help create an 
accommodating legal framework (i.e. ECD being under certain circumstances acceptable, or 
given at least similar lenience ACD typically received for their breaches of law, whereas violent 
                                                 
6
 Examples of these are online petitions, commenting (i.e. online forum discussion) , content 
creation of multiple kinds (videos, images, live steams) and the use of digital means to mobilize 
activist groups. In short: much of online legal protest is only limited by the creativity and  means 
of the protesters. 
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or destructive acts of hacktivism are not).    
   The main argument by the Critical Art Ensemble for including violence in ECD is that it 
is effective. As I repeatedly admit it is entirely imaginably that the injustices faced by protestors 
may be so severe, critical and urgent that any means necessary can be argued appropriate. 
However, this then becomes a different form of dissent and strays from the principles and 
ideational framework. The argument to stretch this framework is unappealing as it dilutes civil 
disobedience to something less potent. My main problem with violence in civil disobedience can 
be described as that it is a violation of democratic rule. Consider the following analogy.  
  Imagine two men stranded on the steppe. Their horses were stolen in a violent raid which 
they managed to fight off, but one of the men is now injured. Their home town is too far away to 
walk. Carrying the injured man is impossible and leaving him is out of the question in fear of the 
return of the raiders. The men will surely be missed in a couple of days and a search and rescue 
party will be sent. Water is hard to come by but thankfully they brought along enough water to 
survive the period they will likely have to wait. They agree to ration the water equally, both 
having 4 cups each day. The injured man stays in the tent while the other man forages. This 
works on the first day, but on the second day the foraging man notices his thirst. The injured man 
has been lying shaded in the tent, not exerting himself much. The foraging man has been out in 
the sun, causing him to sweat. He loses much more water than the injured man. That is why on 
the second day he does not believe the previous arrangement of splitting the water ration half and 
half is fair anymore, he is dehydrating much faster. Moreover, while the injured man is just lying 
in the tent, the foraging man is providing for the both of them. These are convincing arguments 
for a redistribution of the water ration. The foraging man deserves an extra cup and the injured 
man has to give up one cup daily. Let us call this the objectively most just distribution. 
  Now let us limit the foraging man to two ways of going about arranging this new ration. 
The first is persuasion and the second is coercion. The persuasive method is to communicate, to 
attract attention to why the current distribution is unjust and to present his reasonable arguments 
for a new distribution. However, when presenting logical and reasonable arguments for a new 
distribution in a bid for persuading the injured man, the injured man might turn out to react 
unreasonably or egotistically and disagree with it completely. The situation which would follow 
is that the foraging man is at the least less successful in his endeavors as he becomes increasingly 
dehydrated. At the worst he is simply unable to forage due to his extreme dehydration leads to 
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him being unable to continue to face the heat. A relatively small sacrifice by the injured  man can 
alleviate some of the suffering for both as the pains of hunger are staved off.  Alternatively the 
persuasive method also might only prove partially effective which will not lead to the objectively 
most just distribution, with the injured man agreeing for example to compromise by giving half 
of a cup a day to the other man.   
  The coercive method is to enforce a new arrangement. In this instance the foraging man 
would just take the 5 cups without any discussion, holding the water container hostage and out of 
reach for the injured man and only allowing him 3 cups a day. He thus enforces the objectively 
most just distribution. The injured man is unlikely to understand this new situation and is like to 
find it unfair. He is however in no position to seriously contest this new arrangement as he will 
be easily dealt with by the foraging man who is still in fighting shape. When coercing, the 
foraging man might even seriously harm the injured man if he does not cooperate. The foraging 
man is in the right and the coercive way is much more likely to work.  
  The coercive method seems to have all the advantages and little disadvantage. There is 
however, something which irks. Forcing a decision through with whatever means are serviceable 
is in conflict with the process of democratic decision making. The foraging man through the 
coercive instrument made himself a dictator. Even though he achieved the objectively most just 
situation, his use of violence against his previous partner is rapidly returning human affairs to a 
state in which, if all men would acts so, life would again be nasty, brutish and short.  
  Alternatively, the persuasive method has an additional option, one that incorporates 
breaking the agreement through non-violent protest. In this version of persuasion the foraging 
man reasons with the injured man for a re-distribution of the water. If the injured man were to 
disagree with the new and objectively most just distribution the foraging man would simply take 
an additional cup of water anyway. However, he will not forcefully stop the injured man from 
preventing him to take this additional cup. The foraging man breaks the initial agreement but 
does not use force to change the distribution to the objectively fair ratio. This would be akin to 
civil disobedience. It is an additional option for the persuasive method to protest an injustice 
while creating far less animosity than coercion. By virtue of trying to convince the other party 
the persuasive act is the superior method in the nearly just society (see section 2.1) as it shows a 
more democratic type of respect for others within your society as equals.  This is akin to 
Gandhi’s salt Satyagraha in which he violated the British ownership rights of Indian salt of the 
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time. The line then is always that the forager will not fight the injured man or hurt him for the 
extra cup. He keeps bringing to the attention of the other man his thirst until he sees the folly of 
his unreasonableness. Civil disobedience thus adds a tool to combating injustices while, while 
not merely relying on words, but also acting to attract attention and at the same time not letting 
the entire situation crumble into chaos through the use of violence. This only aids the process of 
deliberation in democracy as it fosters “discussion, reflection and debate, citizens’’ initially 
uninformed and possibly selfish views are changed for the better – into judgements close to the 
‘right answer’” (Swift 224, 2014). This is not to say that coercers never attempt to justify their 
acts post-facto, but this justification is secondary to their acts’ efficacy.   
  ECD does harm the properties of website owners and is violent in the same way as taking 
another cup is or taking salt from the Indian beaches was. And as in analogue civil disobedience, 
this curtailed violence can still be considered to fall within acceptable boundaries.  
4.2 Who Owns Cyberspace? 
“’Why’ the critique goes, ‘can’t you come up with a way to protest that 
doesn’t step on somebody else’s toes?’ But the internet as it were, is all 
somebody else’s toes” (Sauter 2014, 4). 
One aspect which is important to make clear is what kind of space “cyberspace” is. Aside from 
its data being stored in a server room, a website is not a tangible place. So does ECD happen in a 
public or a private space?  
  This question matters for civil disobedience, especially with regards to trespass and 
occupation of websites, as we should know whose property is being trespassed or occupied. The 
symmetry claim I investigate is that ECD and ACD are similarly legitimate with regards to 
nonviolence, namely that just as much violence is acceptable for ECD as for ACD. For this claim 
to be acceptable it would be convenient if the spaces in which both occur are similar in relevant 
respects. For instance, if an area of cyberspace is considered public domain, then it can be 
compared to a public square. Consequently you can freely post political comments and content 
similarly to how the public square is open to be used for political speeches and legal protest. 
There is no breach of law there. In contrast, trespass onto and occupations of private areas do by 
definition breach laws. If, in that case, cyberspace is considered an agglomerate of private 
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holdings, then everywhere we go online we are figuratively stepping into someone’s yard. In this 
yard metaphor, private holders of internet space have decided to share publicly only a particular 
sub-area and their services limit visitors in what they are allowed to do in that area. At times this 
even requires registration and agreement to terms of services.        
  Molly Sauter, author of a very recent investigation into DDoS actions, hacktivism, and 
civil disobedience on the internet, has some clear notions about what kind of space cyberspace is. 
She says that public spaces such as a square, a park or a sidewalk do not exist online: It is not 
what could be called a public forum in the traditional sense, even though some message boards 
seem to share similarity with these. Message boards, social networks and blogs are popular 
examples of online places where people can vent their opinions and standpoints to the world. But 
internet service providers own the content. Therefore they are partially responsible to keep that 
content within legal limits (Sauter 2014, 94). It is therefore questionable whether one retains the 
analogue freedoms on the internet. In the U.S. case in particular there is lack of some “crucial 
First Amendment
7
 protections” (Sauter 2014, 94). Sauter stresses that this has serious 
consequences for online activity. Although free press is well protected “the rights of assembly 
and speech of the average individual” are not (Sauter 2014, 94). This is deeply troubling to her, 
and I agree, as it threatens the internet as a “basic outlet of personal expression, association and 
communication” (Sauter 2014, 95).  
  Finally, then, the conclusion here is that the internet is exclusively the agglomeration of 
private properties. Although imaginable, as of yet we do not know any public spaces to exist 
online. Therefore, any protest on it will then per definition breach property rights. This tangibly 
separates ACD from ECD. The former namely has had a  
“history and legal doctrine to support their legitimacy as valid and protected 
political speech” whereas “actions that take place in the online sphere can 
only ever infringe on privately held property. […] As a privately held public 
sphere, disruptive acts of civil disobedience online will always be in conflict 
with dearly held doctrines of private property (Sauter 2014, 95).   
                                                 
7
 “ Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. 
amend. I). 
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I tend to agree with above conclusion and Sauter’s view. Yet it is important to note that this view 
is not shared by all proponents of ECD.  The view of the EDT is different for instance. 
Dominguez believes the web a public space and cites a Libertad! spokesperson who expresses 
that sentiment thus: “‘Although it is virtual in nature, the Internet [sic] is still a real public space. 
Wherever dirty deals go down, protests also have to be possible’” (2008, 666). This matters a lot 
for the civilly disobedient act online. If one views the web is as a public space then trespass is 
much less of an issue. This would be a convenient supporting argument for a defense of ECD, it 
could potentially even make for a defense of DDoS as legal instead of it necessarily being a 
breach of law.  
  Seeing as my view is that websites are privately held property publicly available, such a 
defense is not open to me. An analogy here is that the Electronic Disturbance Theater sees the 
internet as more of a place of roads and public squares, whereas Sauter sees, and I with her, the 
internet as more of a collection of establishments such as lunchrooms, restaurants and bars. The 
former are open to the general public under the purview of a set of laws agreed upon by the 
relevant lawmakers. The rules in the latter establishments however are for a large part up to the 
property owners.   
4.3 DDoS Attacks & Virtual Sit-ins 
One of the most pertinent questions for electronic civil disobedience is whether distributed denial 
of service (DDoS
8
) attacks belong in its toolbox. Taking ECD as a whole is a rather abstract and 
large concept, looking at this particular prevalent tool limits the scope while presenting an 
interesting case in point through which we can introduce some of the relevant concepts and 
aspects of ECD, especially with respect to the differences in comparison to ACD. In addition, 
DDoS is by far the most relevant sub-topic as it is unquestionably the most used method of ECD. 
   DDoS can be simply described as a flooding of an “internet server with traffic in order to 
silence it” (Sauter 2014, xii). The idea is that an internet service has limited resources, which are 
more than enough most of the time to service visitors and deal with their requests. Only seldom 
does  a large amount of unexpected traffic overloads the server capacity. This is exactly what a 
denial of service attack then does. For example, it makes sure such a large amount of visits are 
                                                 
8
 Or sometimes just DoS to describe the more general practice or when the “distributed” aspect 
of the attackers’ side does not apply 
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paid to a website, so that cannot handle the stress of so many tasks to perform. It is thus rendered 
inaccessible. The addition of “distributed” indicates that the attack is made from different 
sources, instead of just one. This is a relevant distinction to make, as in principle there are many 
ways in which a website can be crippled through only one source, i.e. only one computer. 
   One simple way of performing a distributed denial of service attack is what is called a 
virtual sit-in. An organized collective visits a website and hits the refresh button until the server 
is overwhelmed by the amount of work it has to perform. This is technically a distributed DDoS 
attack, although it is a technologically speaking straightforward and can be done manually by 
people without advanced computer skills. These people are not using “hacker tools”, moreover 
they are showing the vitality and urgency of the issue they aim to address by showing mass 
support. Meikle (2008), Sauter (2014) and Dominguez (2008) describe multiple occurrences in 
which tens of thousands join in. The largest occurrence of a virtual sit-in is described by 
Dominguez as having happened in 2005. A U.S. anti-immigration organization was the target of 
more than 78,500 people from around the world (2008, 662), who could participate from the 
comfort of their own homes. We will see some more prominent examples in the coming chapter.   
  ECD, just as ACD, cannot be in the interest of just one private individual (Rawls 1971, 
365). This is not to say that it is necessary per se for there to be many participants. While it must 
be noted that having a wide base of support certainly helps bring vitality to the issue this is not a 
prerequisite per se of a civilly disobedient action. As I have argued in chapter 2 one person alone 
can carry out a civilly disobedient act. This is therefore also possible online. If a person acts 
conformingly to the definition I set out in chapter 2 in order to repair justice where she finds it 
broken, her act can be defended as civilly disobedient, as it is in the interest of the entire society, 
not solely this one individual.   
5. Practical Examples 
For the sake of clarity this chapter highlights a number of practical examples. These examples 
make clear how electronic civil disobedience works and what the state of legality of these online 
acts currently is. The first section deals with the prominent Lufthansa case, which serves as a role 
model for how electronic civil disobedience, as I have argued, ought to be done. The second 
section deals with the German court rulings in response to that case. The third and final section 
deals with some other example cases while discussing the legal responses to acts of ECD. 
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5.1 Lufthansa Case 
2001 Saw a political protest called the “Deportation Class”. It was mainly undertaken by a 
cooperation of two activist groups: Kein Mensh ist illegal (No man is illegal) and Libertad! 
These organizations protested the use of Lufthansa’s planes by the German government to expel 
immigrants (Sauter 2014, 53). 
  For this protest, partakers used an altered version of the FloodNet tool (Sauter 2014, 53). 
This tool was created by the Electronic Disturbance Theatre for launching DDoS attacks. It was 
used to target Lufthansa’s main website. Participants numbered around thirteen thousand. This 
overwhelming amount of traffic caused, as would be expected, periods of the webpage being 
unavailable. In addition to this online action, there were concurrent protests at the stockholder 
meetings and press releases. The action was effective, causing Lufthansa to stop being a vehicle 
(in both the figurative and literal sense) for the deportation of immigrants (Sauter 2014, 53).   
   There are a couple of salient points which Sauter highlights about the protest which 
reflect well upon the action as a reflection of the principles I have proposed ECD should take 
with it in the transition from ACD. First, there was a conscientious aim. The aim of the protest 
action was stated to be to negatively affect the sale of airline tickets and influence public 
attention. This attention was to be targeted towards certain parts of the business model of 
Lufthansa. In this way activists aimed to achieve a change in the company’s behavior (Sauter 
2014, 54).  
  Second, the action was entirely public. Beforehand, the actions were publicized, there 
were press releases (Sauter 2014, 53) and actions were announced beforehand as Ricardo 
Dominguez writes:  
“All the activists and artists announced the dates and reasons for the actions 
online, in the streets and inside the shareholders’ meeting – nothing was 
hidden. This is important because ECD is about bringing together real bodies 
and digital bodies in a transparent manner that follows the tradition of Civil 
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Disobedience – that people are willing to break a law (like blocking the 
street) to uphold a higher law
9” (Dominguez 663, 2008).    
Here it is clear that Dominguez, who is the founder of the EDT, kept strictly with a second 
criterion of Rawls’s. An effect of publicizing this act beforehand which is interesting to note is 
that Lufthansa minimized downtime effectively by hiring additional server capacity for coping 
with the increased traffic (Dominguez 665, 2008). This protection was only possible because of 
the warning which was given. Limiting the effectiveness of the Denial of Service attack does not 
have to be adverse on the efficacy of the aims of the action. As bothered people look for the 
cause of a website’s unavailability they likely come into contact with the political protest. Less 
downtime can then be expected to lead to less attention. However, it is difficult to predict the 
degree of media and public attention given to the protest, perhaps the simple announcement 
draws many supporters. In fact, it is certainly preferable to achieve no downtime of a target 
website but receive a lot of media attention than to black out the website for a week but get no 
attention. The attack is but a means, public attention for addressing a perceived injustice is 
always the end.   
  There remains but one last condition to be satisfied, that of nonviolence. The Lufthansa 
website saw brief periods of downtime, this damage, or in other words violence to property, was 
unquestionably done. However, even though the website was at times unavailable for online 
access the corporation itself was not. The company was undamaged in its capability to use its 
airplanes, to proceed with standard operating procedures and furthermore was unaffected in its 
means to communicate. Communications were still available internally, from employees or parts 
of the company to one another, as well as externally, for public relations or press releases (Sauter 
2014, 53). The basic functions of the company remained thus largely unaffected.  
  Notably, a sudden collapse of the means of communications especially in the example of 
airlines could be catastrophic when for instance the means for the deliverance of emergency 
messages to pilots are severed (more on this in section 6.2). The periods of downtime of the 
website though, and perhaps more importantly the media attention arising from these moments, 
                                                 
9 What Dominguez refers to here as a higher law I have referred to as a society-wide overarching 
shared conception of justice 
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led to media coverage and attention, which was all the activists were after, after all. This instance 
of a virtual sit-in is a shining example of nonviolent political protest.    
5.2 German Court Ruling 
Andreas-Thomas Vogel was the man behind the libertad.de website and pivotal in the 
organization and call to action. Therefore he was held responsible for the action and deemed the 
instigator of the various actions of the various actions against Lufthansa. Vogel was brought up 
against charges of doing financial damage to Lufthansa, specifically by causing a drop in ticket 
sales and adding to Lufthansa’s costs as they had to buy additional server capacity to deal with 
the attacks. In the 2005 trial the German lower court in Frankfurt ruled in favor of Lufthansa. 
They determined that Vogel was guilty of the use of force (Sauter 2014, 140). “The online 
demonstration was found to be a threat of an appreciable harm as defined by German Penal Code 
Section 240
i
; Vogel was therefore found to be inciting people to commit Coercion [sic]” 
(Dominguez 2008, 665).  
  The connection of this case to the section of the German penal code is interesting in and 
of itself. The section appended at the end of this thesis, reads that the use of force or threat of 
serious harm in order to have another person commit, suffer or omit an act is unlawful. In this 
case you could apply this penal code in two ways. In the first way, Vogel encouraged fellow 
activists to commit their act of protest and this act was in the judge’s view serious harm. 
However, as encouragement is quite different from the use of force or threats this is not likely to 
have been the tack taken in this case.  
  The second interpretation is that the act itself, for which Vogel was deemed responsible, 
makes Lufthansa suffer financially and at the same time feel pressured to omit the act of 
deporting immigrants. A DDoS attack then, is a use of force in order to achieve this. As force is 
coercive it is not civilly disobedient. As we concluded in section 3.1, the tactics of civil 
disobedience are traditionally of a more persuasive nature. The goal is to communicate issues of 
injustices and to convince the political power majority that change is necessary. Threats and 
other coercive acts can also voice their disagreement with current policy, yet they undermine the 
likelihood of mutual respect in political negotiation. Moreover, in section 4.1 I dismissed 
violence as not having a place in ECD, with the exception of a curtailed violence against the 
target websites, which is very relevant here and will become more salient in the next paragraph. 
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He had to either pay a fine worth 90 days’ pay or go to jail for 90 days (Dominguez 2008, 665). 
If the story would have ended here, it would be another example of government crackdown on 
online dissent, whatever its form. However, Vogel appealed the ruling in a Higher Regional 
Court. 
  This higher German court overruled the lower court’s decision. Vogel was found not 
guilty of the coercive use of force. The higher court’s judge brought into question the previous 
determination of the meaning of the use of “force”. Moreover, Dominguez brings up that even in 
its violence against the website the action was unclear to have been very successful: “it remains 
unclear how long the website was actually slowed down and whether it ever went offline 
completely” (2008, 665). With this ruling the court set an important precedent for the building of 
legitimacy of ECD.  
  The Lufthansa protestors saw their action as comparable to traditional sit-ins. In this view 
virtual sit-ins are simply the updated version of what Civil Rights era protestors did in the United 
States. In retrospective comparison it is clear that sitting in a restaurant to protest segregationist 
policy also works through denying service to other customers and made it less likely the 
establishment received extra customers. But this is by far not the most important aim of the 
protest. The goal was never to incur financial disaster for the restaurant owner, but to spread 
awareness of an objectionable policy. And in that those traditional sit-ins have been more than 
successful as the images of sit-ins have been imprinted in the contemporary collective 
consciousness. Decades later their message still lives on. Denial of service attacks are but the 
next logical installment of the same type of act which still serve as a form of civil protest in 
reaction to perceived injustices. When both can be described as civilly disobedient acts through 
the use of Rawls’ definition, it would be morally inconsistent to tolerate, allow for or even 
respect the traditional form but not the virtual form.  
5.3 ECD’s Current Legality 
There is a different degree to which electronic civilly disobedient acts, such as a DDoS are 
punished in comparison to the analogue form. As of yet the charges and punishments sought for 
virtual sit-ins are considerably higher than those for the analogue predecessor. For instance, 
American sit-ins when criminally prosecuted are typically consisting of charges of criminal 
trespass (Sauter 142, 2014). The punishment for such trespass in Massachusetts is, for example, 
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is: “a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more than thirty days or 
both such fine and imprisonment” (Massachusetts General Laws Part IV, Title 1, Chapter 266, 
Section 120
ii
). Comparing this with the charges leveled at the partakers of virtual sit-ins reveals a 
shocking discrepancy. Against the instigators of Operation Payback charges went up to half a 
million dollars in fines and fifteen years in prison (Sauter 2014, 141). One particularly 
disconcerting example of the disproportional response is that of the case of Eric J. Rosol (Sauter 
2014, 141). In 2013 he participated in a DDoS for about one minute. He was one of multiple 
people who participated in the DDoS, which was itself part of a larger protest against the Koch 
Industries. Rosol, a truck driver, protested against a decision made by the governor of Wisconsin 
“to strip public employees of their collective bargaining rights” (Sauter 2014, 141). The website 
was rendered inaccessible for only fifteen minutes. Yet Rosol was ordered to pay 183,000 dollars 
in fines and sentenced to two years probation. In the same year in which Rosol had to pay this 
fine Koch Industries, a global conglomerate, made 115 billion dollars in revenues (Sauter 2014, 
114).  
   This might be justifiable if there is a different type of act taking place. It is certainly true 
that DDoS attack can be used for far more nefarious purposes and in the next chapter I will seek 
to disentangle these other types of actions from the political protest I am getting at. However, as 
I argue and as is the case in the Lufthansa example, the values of ACD can be and demonstrably 
have been maintained in the transition to ECD. If there is an adherence to the Rawlsian definition 
of civil disobedience, then it is certainly a similar enough act to be treated equally in a legal 
sense. My argument then, in the simplest form, is that the virtual sit-in is an appropriate name for 
an act which is the virtual (in both the literal and figurative sense of the word) equivalent of the 
analogue sit-in. There ought to be equal respect and legitimacy for equal acts, no matter what 
platform they take place on.   
6. Transition 
We have reached the figurative top of the stairs as we come to the last part of my discourse. In 
this final chapter I will first describe how the torch can be passed from ACD to ECD as DDoS 
attacks and virtual sit-ins become more respected and legitimate forms of online political protest. 
Following this, is the last section in which I tie together the preceding arguments and aim to 
present why and how ECD can inherit its predecessors’ values. 
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6.1 DDoS as Civil Disobedience 
Somehow attention must be attracted, by which I mean there must be some appeal to majority in 
political power. Otherwise deviant, anti-establishment opinions are unlikely to be heard. They do 
not resort to these means because they fear then this issue which they feel is very important will 
be dismissed or forgotten. “For unpopular and dissenting causes to attract the attention of a news 
media industry that, for economic reasons, is often uninterested in covering them, disruption of 
some kind can be necessary […] Online, that disruption may take the form of a DDoS action, 
while in the physical world it may take another, perhaps more familiar form. What is critical is 
that the status quo, the normal flow of information must be disrupted if dissenting voices are to 
be both voiced and hear” (Sauter 2014, 36).  
   Still, it is important to note that in law codes around the world, this dirsruptive behavior 
is considered criminal (Sauter 2014, 12-3). But even though DoS is in fact illegal, that does not 
mean that it ought to be. Sauter places herself firmly in the camp of those who believe that a 
virtual sit-in is comparable to ACD’s sit-ins. She endorses DDoS as a tool of ECD. As I will 
expound in the final chapter, I agree that DoS, and especially virtual sit-ins, can be tools of 
political protest, albeit under a set of clear restraints, so as to stay true to its purpose. 
  Yet there are those who criticize it vehemently, underlining its criminality for instance.  
In this section I will examine the arguments of both sides and contrast them. Central in this 
polemic is the censorship argument. 
Oxblood Ruffin is one of the most vocal opponents of the use of DoS as a political protest tool. 
His is the strongest argument ECD which I have found. He is a founding Cult of the Dead Cow 
member, which is a hacktivist organization. Hacktivism, a portmanteau contracting “hacking”iii 
and “activism” is related to the current topic under discussion here and is described by Sauter to 
be “technologically based activism, to be defeating state censorship and the disruption of online 
communication via the creation and distribution of tools to evade censorious regimes” (2014, 
47). For hacktivists, censorship is an evil above all else. Free access to information, free transfer 
of information and freedom of speech are the most important values to hacktivists
10
.  
                                                 
10
 These values are important as well to hackers. In the description of them in the most positive 
light as some would describe themselves. This most positive light is as explorers and lovers of 
knowledge, white hat hackers.  Hacking tools can certainly be used for malicious purposes, some 
would describe these as black hat hackers. In between are grey hat hackers. 
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  The hacktivist way to deal with the problem of freedom of speech, namely that some 
people say or write disagreeable or even appalling things, follows from this attiude. The solution, 
which is certainly not an unpopular liberal view, is more speech. Oxblood Ruffin opposes the use 
of DDoS as it blocks free speech, it censors. If this is true then it is like mobs going around the 
internet and silencing their political opponents when they act in a disagreeable way or say certain 
disagreeable things. This is not the kind of behavior which fits the value system of the liberal 
democracy. Even if combatting a perceived injustice is the goal of an act of electronic civil 
disobedience, answering it with another unjust act is unsatisfactory, especially seeing as the 
appeal of ECD is to an overarching sense of justice.  
   Moreover, censorship in silencing political opponents is a natural enemy of the 
democratic process. A large part of making democratic decision beyond the merely procedural is 
in public discussion. As said in section 4.2: “‘discussion, reflection and debate, citizens’ initially 
uninformed and possibly selfish views are changed for the better – into judgements close to the 
‘right answer’” (Swift 224, 2014). In western liberal democracies, which are examples coming to 
mind swiftest when talking about nearly just societies
11
, having these discussion, reflection and 
debates are strong signs of the vitality of a democratic regime. 
  If a DDoS attack is analogous to silencing opponent you disagree with, the 
communication is a one-way, exclusionary affair. There is little place for dialogue or 
deliberation. Only side is speaking and gives the other no chance to respond. This criticism goes 
right to the heart of the matter, the view of what civil disobedience is. I have stated that it is a 
politically communicative act applied in what is called the near just society. Disallowing for the 
freedom of speech to respond to a politically communicative act online is fundamentally in 
conflict with the freedom of speech.   
  Ruffin expressed his sentiment as follows: “No rationale, even in the service of the 
highest ideals, makes [DDoS actions] anything other than what they are – illegal, unethical, and 
uncivil. One does not make a better point in a public forum by shouting down one’s opponent” 
(Sauter 2014, 47). Hacktivists value the free and uncensored flow of information which the web 
makes possible. Free speech on the web is a prime example. DDoS attacks then are objectionable 
as they are barriers to free expression. 
                                                 
11 Although I am sure that the notion that Western liberal democracies is debatable it is outside the scope of this 
investigation. 
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Groups like the EDT see increased legitimacy in their actions when they are supported by large 
groups (Sauter 2014, 48). Having mass support namely confirms an issue being important to a 
large amount of people. Moreover, as the action is certainly is illegal, some groups take care that 
their action is mostly symbolic. In this way they do not do deeply damage to the targeted 
system’s functionality, while still aiming to get maximum media coverage of the issue they aim 
to address. 
  Nevertheless, what can be called the criticism of censorship can hold considerable 
weight, seeing as some targets mainly exist as online services. A good example would be a 
popular political blog. When a group decides that its writings propagate a perceived injustice, 
this group can resort to the use of DDoS. They might decide to flood it with so many visits that it 
renders the blog unable to respond to criticism, stalling any further debate. If the blog could 
respond, it could lead to rational deliberation which might even lead to both groups on opposing 
sides of the argument growing to understand one another’s views while “agreeing to disagree”. 
They might even eventually come to some compromise. The attack puts an end to the argument 
and silences the perceived wrongdoer. Thus it can be viewed as an illiberal tool to stymie free 
speech, and this ought never to be a goal of a civilly disobedient act.  
  Moreover, DDoS can be, and often has been, used for other purposes than political 
protest. Gamers who feel aggrieved attack the servers of popular online multiplayer games such 
as Minecraft or World of Warcraft in hopes to get back at those who banned them even if they 
knowingly and willingly violated terms of services and their bans from those games were 
legitimate. Commenters on websites who feel hurt since their elaborate comments did not receive 
moderator approval and decide to settle their personal grievances, or even just whimsical or 
frivolous attacks are all possible with the means of a DDoS. These are all examples of DDoS 
attacks which cannot be placed in the category of electronic civil disobedience. If we look back 
at Rawls’ definition, these examples most often fail conscientious and public criteria. As these 
attacks are often private vendettas there is no larger scheme of overarching justice which is being 
addressed. A good measure to attempt to satisfy both criteria before the act is to write and 
disseminate a manifesto, or at least some form public statement with the intent of justification. 
The censorship argument works rather well for the individual political blog. However, there are 
other counter-examples in which it does not hold up. Large multinational corporations have 
access to other means of communication for instance. While their website and e-mail is down, 
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they can still communicate through platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Sauter finds it 
important to recognize the “unequal power dynamics between targets and activists” (2014, 49) 
which exists in the example of a group of those performing the DDoS with regards to the large 
multinational corporation. Furthermore, the author dispels the censorship criticism further by 
saying that “in many cases [the censorship criticism] also fails to interrogate how censorship 
could be practiced, if at all, by entities not occupying a dominant position in the current power 
hierarchy” (Sauter 2014, 49). Sauter recognizes DDoS as a tactic of disruption, but this does not 
equate the destruction of free speech in many cases. 
  One relevant example is the attempt at the disruption of the World Trade Organization’s 
meeting in 1999. Although the WTO’s website was slowed down and the e-mail accounts of 
those working for the WTO were bombarded with large amounts of e-mail with big attachments, 
the event still took place largely unhindered. Press releases were still made and people attended; 
the conference largely took place as planned (Sauter 2014, 39-49). Certainly, there was a 
debilitating effect on parts of online communications, yet the activists did not sever the WTO’s 
free speech. 
6.2 The Ancillary and Integral 
One further specification is necessary about what I would like to call the ancillary and the 
integral. These are names I give to different types of targets of DDoS attacks. With the integral I 
mean to say those parts which are not reasonably vital to the safety, security or well-being of 
persons. In contrast, ancillary targets are not so essential, their temporary dysfunction is no more 
than a slight nuisance or hindrance in day-to-day affairs.  
  Note however, that attacks on ancillary targets might cause financial damage. It is hard to 
determine what amount of financial stress is acceptable and I will certainly not attempt such a 
feat here. The challenge lies in the fact that there are too many varying factors per case. One 
could for instance look at the damages done and compare that to yearly revenues of a target 
corporation or institution. One could also appeal to the greatness of the injustice protested again. 
But are injustices always expressible in currency? We have determined an act of ECD to be 
politically communicative and persuasive in essence. It ought not to be a financial attack by 
design, this is essentially a byproduct. In some cases this byproduct might get considerably out 
of hand. To the question of whether this is justified I cannot see another answer than the 
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disappointing: it depends on the case. 
  The following passage from a documentary on the United States’ defense plans 
accurately describes the integral importance of certain digital networks.  
“All of our weapon systems: our ships, our planes, our tanks, they depend on 
networks to function. […]. [Terrorists] use networks to communicate among 
themselves, they use networks to advertise themselves and we use networks 
to combat them and detect them. So all over the whole spectrum from 
traditional state to state conflict down to the shadow wars of today, cyber 
pervades all of that.” US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter12 
My contention is that integral targets are off limits in electronic civil disobedience. In the context 
of the near just society especially (see section 2.1) attacking such targets has a serious potential 
to endanger fellow citizens or other innocents. Blacking out police communication is a prime 
example. Although there certainly might be injustices committed by a police force which are 
worthy of civilly disobedient protest, attacking their communication can cause disaster. Imagine 
that their communication falters just as a shooting breaks out; otherwise preventable deaths are 
likely to occur as the response force is uncoordinated and confused. Finally, the Lufthansa case 
(sections 5.1 & 5.2) is a good example of targeting the ancillary instead of the integral. We saw it 
explicitly mentioned that the acts of disruption targeted only the website, not any operation or 
communication technology responsible for safe flights.  
6.3 Inheriting ACD’s Values 
There are a number of obstacles that are necessary to overcome before the torch can be passed to 
electronic civil disobedience First of all, it has become clear that there are significant differences 
in the digital environment in comparison to physical environment. Virtual sit-ins always intrude 
upon private property. It is not at all like protesting in a public park or on a square. Inherently, 
electronic civil disobedience is violent with regards to property as it infringes upon private rights 
to freely make decisions about that which is owned. The act in and of itself is a breach of law.  
  The result of a virtual sit-in is for instance that the website owner can no longer provide 
                                                 
12 “Cyberspies, Nukes, and the New Cold War: Shane Smith Interviews Ashton Carter (Part 1)”, a video interview 
by Vice News’ Shane Smith.  Available at: https://news.vice.com/video/cyberspies-nukes-and-the-new-cold-war-
shane-smith-interviews-ashton-carter-part-1 
37 
 
the service she has built and for which she pays the cost, both in time and money, to keep 
operational. Whimsical, frivolous or wanton destruction are out of the question, similar to how 
they have no place in ACD. In ECD this requirement to self-regulate becomes of increased 
importance. This is why a convincing justification hinges upon whether there is such a strong 
rationale, buttressing actions with a conscientious conviction. 
  Moreover, in the current legal framework participating in a DDoS is criminal (see section 
5.3). However, my investigation has led me to the conviction that electronic civil disobedience 
can be justified if it satisfies Rawls’ definition. If protesters publicize their intentions beforehand, 
it strengthens their act. Furthermore, acting conscientiously means that such a rationale ought to 
be included in such a protest. In order to strengthen its position as political protest ECD is to stay 
far away from witch-hunting or pursuing personal vendettas online. The former is just attacking 
or harassing someone for holding different views whereas the latter is akin to vigilantism. 
Neither appeal to an overarching sense of justice. Both entail personal attacks with at least the 
possibility of serious psychological trauma. At times there can even be physically violent 
repercussion as participants of a witch-hunt take it upon themselves to follow physically visit 
“witches” and attack them.  
  In addition, as the similar means which are applicable in the transition from ACD are 
occupation and trespass and we have set limits on these, these limits should still hold. If a virtual 
sit-in (in-)directly damages a business, the owner must be recompensed. Operating under the 
civilly disobedient banner ought never give license for whimsical or frivolous destruction and 
always be governed by the disobedients conscientiousness. Therefore, knowing and willing 
damage which is unrelated to the civilly disobedient act is simply criminal and unacceptable.  
  As much as possible then, electronic civil disobedience is to be nonviolent. For one, this 
serves to extend and appropriate the historical associations. Calabrese writes that this is 
important for maintaining the meaning and relevance of the concept in our “a system of political 
thought” (2004, 335). It is my judgement that with careful consideration, caution and planning 
political protest under the banner of ECD can live up to those demands. Adding violence 
dismantles and discredits the possibility of the transition, by corrupting this inheritance. 
Moreover, “[n]ot only is nonviolence intrinsically virtuous, it also lends moral authority to the 
effectiveness of civil disobedience as a form of strategic action” (Calabrese 2004, 335). 
   Meikle presents the argument that the CAE aims for ECD to include, for instance, 
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surreptitious and clandestine hacking. Here is a significant break from Rawls’ criteria. Whenever 
a breach of law is undertaken frivolously it can be dismissed easily as criminal as it breaks the 
conscientious criteria. The clandestine aspect clearly is in conflict with Rawls’ criterion of civil 
disobedience having to be public. When political activists in cyberspace violates one or more of 
Rawls’ criteria they might be placed under the novel header of “hacktivists”, it should be clear 
that they are no civil disobedients and that to place them in the ECD camp would weaken the 
force of civil disobedience as a whole as the strength of civil resistance lies exactly in its 
adherence to its principles, namely Rawls’ criteria. A virtual sit-in is certainly comparable to an 
occupation or a sit-in, as in those analogue examples services of the targeted organizations are 
obstructed in their usual functioning as well. However, as DDoS attacks have often seen use by 
criminals, some are offended by this comparison. This sentiment is most clearly expressed by 
Oxblood Ruffin: “It’s like a cat burglar comparing himself to Rosa Parks. Implicit in the notion 
of civil disobedience is a willful violation of the law; deliberate arrest; and having one’s day in 
court. There is none of that in DDoSing. By comparison to the heroes of the Civil Rights 
Movement DDoS tactics are craven” (Sauter 2014, 5). 
   Ruffin dismissing the tactics as craven would hold weight if simply the naming and 
symbolism were copied while the responsibilities which come with upholding the historical 
valuation were denied. Yet, as we have seen it is entirely imaginable that a virtual sit-in breaches 
a law with the aim to change policy and is public, conscientious and nonviolent. Moreover, 
fidelity to law does not suddenly go out of the window with the transition to ECD.    
7. Conclusion 
Looking back at Rawls quotation from the introduction, which I used as a guide in the 
introduction, I must assess whether I imagine this work would have been regarded by him as 
worthwhile. I believe I have offered a perspective from which to approach electronic civil 
disobedience. I have identified what are the most important considerations. The first question 
was what exactly violence is and the second was what constitutes violence to online property. To 
the first question we have found an encompassing definition of Morreal’s, which includes 
psychological violence and damage to the ability to freely control and own property. This 
definition is tempered by Moraro’s Kantian caveat to not use people merely as means. To the 
second question I have made clear that a denial of service always infringes upon someone’s 
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property rights, it does some violence. Moreover I have analyzed the most salient cases in point, 
DDoS attacks and virtual sit-ins. Throughout, the aim has been to clarify and consider opposing 
arguments before I arrived at the judgement of allowing for electronic civil disobedience to 
inherit analogue civil disobedience’s historical values and respect. And even further, I advocate 
an approach of continuity from ACD to ECD with regards to the theory proposed by Rawls albeit 
under curtailed conditions.  
  The importance of creating limits to political protest online has been evident for the 
violent actions which can be undertaken online. Some have advocated for the inclusion of these 
in the definition of ECD, but I have advocated against this repeatedly. Civilly disobedient 
protest, which per definition breaches a law, demands restraint, both on the web and in the street. 
Otherwise it undermines what is at its essence, namely a tool of civil political communication.  
  This is not to say violent political protest cannot be legitimized under certain oppressive 
regimes, but violence cannot be part of ECD as it takes away from the strength of the civil 
disobedience movement. It is useful for conceptual clarity for ECD to retain conceptual links 
with its predecessor for it to be recognized within our system of political thought. More 
importantly however, in this period of transition ECD has to take with it its analogue forbears’ 
conscientiousness for it to retain its value. The appeal of civil disobedience is always to an 
overarching sense of justice. Frivolous damages, whimsical violence or wanton destruction can 
never be part of that. As much as possible ECD is to remain nonviolent.  
  There are two penultimate notes I want to make. The first is about ECD’s damage to 
online property. DDoS actions harm the properties of website owners. However, it is violent in 
the same way as taking salt from the Indian beaches was in Gandhi’s protest or sitting in a 
restaurant illegally in the Civil Rights era protests. And as in analogue civil disobedience, this 
curtailed violence can still be considered to fall within acceptable boundaries. The second note is 
that it would not be morally consistent to criminalize a type of act online, but allow for it to a 
considerably farther extent in the offline world. When two acts can both be described as civilly 
disobedient through the use of Rawls’ definition, it would be morally inconsistent to tolerate, 
allow for or even respect the traditional form but not the virtual form. 
   As more of our communication is done online, so is our politics. And so it is only logical 
that political protest has not been slow in following. Although far from being the wild wild web 
it once was, there remain grey areas. Creating clarity in those areas is one of the major 
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challenges of our era. I advocate decriminalizing or tolerating DDoS in certain situations.  
  Allowing for ECD puts a powerful tool in the hands of conscientious political protesters, 
which is not to be taken up lightly. Yet, when their intent is to address, repair and communicate 
injustices to others, that tool being available should be desirable. It can be a potent vehicle for 
narrowing “the disparity between the conscientious convictions of those who accept the basic 
principles of a democratic society” (Rawls 1971, 362). 
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Appendix 
                                                 
i
German Penal Code: 
 Section 240 
Using threats or force to cause a person to do, suffer or omit an act 
(1) Whosoever unlawfully with force or threat of serious harm causes a person to commit, suffer 
or omit an act shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. 
(2) The act shall be unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed inappropriate for 
the purpose of achieving the desired outcome. 
(3) The attempt shall be punishable. 
(4) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five years. 
An especially serious case typically occurs if the offender 
1.  causes another person to engage in sexual activity; 
2.  causes a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy; or 
3.  abuses his powers or position as a public official. 
 
ii
 Massachusetts General Laws Part IV, Title 1, Chapter 266, Section 120: “Entry upon private 
property after being forbidden as trespass; prima facie evidence; penalties; arrests; tenants or 
occupants excepted”. Available at: 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter266/Section120  
 
iii
 For insight into the hacker mentality, an excerpt from the hacker manifesto:  
“This is our world now... the world of the electron and the switch, the 
beauty of the baud.  We make use of a service already existing without paying 
for what could be dirt-cheap if it wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and 
you call us criminals.  We explore... and you call us criminals.  We seek 
after knowledge... and you call us criminals.  We exist without skin color, 
without nationality, without religious bias... and you call us criminals. 
You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us 
and try to make us believe it's for our own good, yet we're the criminals” (Blankenship1986). 
